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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DON WEILER BENNION,
Executor of the Estate of Heber Bennion,
Jr., VERA W. BENNION and
BENNION RANCHING CO., a Utah
Corporation,
Plaintiffa,
vs.

Case No.
12716

DUDLEY M. AMOSS and DIAN AM.
AMOSS, his wife, and JOHN DOES
Nos. l through 5,
Defendants.

Brief of Defendants - Appellants

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF A CASE
This is a case where the Plaintiffs-Respondents
sought to accelerate the payment of a note and foreclose a mortgage securing the same, and the Defendants-Appellants asserted certain affirmative defenses
and urged a counterclaim against the Plaintiffs-Respondents.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court granted to Plaintiffs-Respondents
a summary judgment in the sum of $140,586.16 and
decreed foreclosure of their mortgage, but a hearing
was not had on the affirmative defenses of DefendantsAppellants, nor did the court rule on their counterclaim.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants-Appellants seek an order of this Court
reversing the judgment of the lower court, with directions that a trial be had on all the issues of the case,
including the counterclaim, prior to the entry of any
judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
It is felt by the writer that a background of this
case should be set forth to more fully illuminate the
immediate facts before the Court.

For the sake of clarity, Plaintiffs-Respondents will
hereinafter be referred to as Bennions and the Defendants-Appellants will hereinafter be referred to as Amoss.
In 1964, Heber Bennion came to Amoss, who owned
a ranch neighboring Bennion, and suggested that Amoss
buy the Bennion ranch at a certain figure. Amoss agreed
and a contract was executed. A few weeks later, Bennion changed his mind and told Amoss that he was
taking his land back. As Amoss, at that point, had spent
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many thousands of dollars on the ranching operation,
he did not feel inclined to fold his tent and steal away.
After days of wrangling, Amoss and Bennion, in the
company of Bennion's lawyer, agreed on a compromise
settlement to avoid legal action. A few weeks later,
Bennion again changed his mind, and Amoss brought
suit for specific performance of the original contract.
The lower court ruled in favor of Amoss and Bennion
appealed. This Court affirmed, but added that as Amoss
had agreed in the compromise to pay Bennion an additional $17,500., he should do so and he should not be
allowed any attorney's fees. The case was remanded
with directions to wind up a few loose ends. The lower
court, not to be outdone by the generosity of the Aplate Court, decided that as Amoss had allowed Bennion
to reserve 40 acres of the so-called Kiel place, which
was one of the ranches making up the Bennion ranches,
Bennion should be given the whole Kiel place, about
eighty acres, and of course the contract price would not
be reduced accordingly. The court further allowed
Bennion 52 shares of water, which, again under the
compromise, Amoss had agreed to let Bennion keep,
however, for this the court directed that Bennion must
pay. Not so! Again Bennion appealed, and this time
he came away with $5,000. worth of water stock for
nothing.
During all of this time, Amoss had sought to be
heard on certain claims against Bennions regarding
interference with Amoss' business, conversion of personal property and other tort and contract actions. The
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inclusions of these claims apparently spoiled the neatness of the package and the claims were ever separated
to be handled later. Later came and went and Heber
Bennion died.
A.moss had previously paid off the Bennions' indebtedness of $35,000. to the Utah P.C.A., some of
which came from the old Bennion livestock and some
of which from Amoss' pocket. Amoss had further kept
the Federal Land Bank of Berkeley current and paid
off the $5,000. plus interest indebtedness of Bennions
to one Rodney Schofield. In November, 1969, Bennions
completed the title work on the property and Amoss
signed the myriad notes, mortgages and other papers
papers presented to him for signature, giving Bennions
a further $35,000. in cash. Amoss did not until 1970
realize that the notes contained a prepayment penalty.
A.moss also felt that as the courts had enforced every
concession that they had made to Bennions as a compromise to avoid litigation, (and indeed more as Bennion had ended up with the gift of an additional 40
acres and did not have to pay for the water stock or
attorney's fees) , that the acreage release clause agreed
to by Heber Bennion should be incorporated in the
mortgages.
Following the death of Heber Bennion, a claim
was made by Amoss against the estate and an action
subsequently filed thereon as Daggett County civil No.
132. The action slowly proceeded to a motion to dismiss
Plaintiffs' complaint, which motion was still under
advisement upon the commencement of the subject
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action .During all this time, Bennions carried on the
tradition set by Heber Bennion and continue to interfere in the financial and ranching affairs of Amoss.
On December 17, 1970, Amoss was served with a
Summons and a Complaint in the instant action, R-134.
Amoss answered, R-123. Bennions moved the court for
a summary judgment, R-118, and for sanctioning of
Amoss and his lawyer under Rule 11, Utah R.C.P.,
R-117, the latter apparently on the grounds that Amoss
had had the unmitigated gall to resist counsel in the
mere taking of property. The court denied these motions, R-81 and R-110. Bennions then had an ex parte
order signed appointing a receiver for the ranch, R-106.
At a rehearing of this matter, the court refused to
appoint a receiver and Amoss' tenant was left in possession, R-91.
In May, 1971, case no. 132, came on for trial and
the jury returned a verdict in favor of Amoss. On July
28, 1971, this verdict was set aside by the trial court
and a new trial was ordered; an interlocutory appeal
was denied by this Court on October 19, 1971.
On July 22, 1971, Bennions mailed to Amoss interrogatories, R-71, and requests for admissions, R-68.
On August 12, 1971, Bennions mailed to Amoss a notice
of hearing to compel answers, R-66. Amoss had not
answered Bennion's discovery because of the pend ency
of case no. 132, which pendency was the result of Bennions' motion to set aside the verdict, which made the
questions in the discovery meaningless at that time.
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Bennions at the same time renewed their petition for
the appointment of a receiver for the ranch, R-60, and
served Amoss and his tenant with Orders to Show
Cause, R-I6 and R-20. As the lower court had previously denied Bennions' motion for summary judgment and no new factual material had been presented
to the court in support of the renewed motion, Amoss
concentrated on the rebuttal of the wild allegations made
by Bennions in support of their renewed petition for
the appointment of a receiver, R-60. This proved to be
a costly error in tactics, R-65. From this judgment
Amoss appealed, R-I4.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR THE PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS WAS NOT JUSTIFIED.
Summary judgment was granted by the trial court
based on the pleadings, affidavits and exhibits on file.
Don Bennion's affidavit in support of summary
judgment, R-ll9, consists in part of self-serving declarations, e.g., paragraphs IO and I I, "Defendant Dudley Amoss was given full credit upon the purchase price
of the subject real property and Bennion livestock for
the purchase price received by Plaintiffs for said alleged converted cows and calves ... ", quite true as far as it goes. However, the credit given was
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the market value of non-pregnant cows, (the cows converted were pregnant), and calves at the date of the
conversion, with no payment for the harm done Amoss'
business. The same affidavit, at paragraph 9, states as
fact certain legal conclusions, which of course is in flagrant violation of Rule 56 (e), Utah R.C.P., FORM
OF
VITS, "Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth facts as would be admissable in evidence, and
shall show affirmatively that affiant is competent to
testify to the matters stated therein. (Emphasis supplied). Paragraph 7 disagrees with admissions made
by Heber Bennion in prior depositions which were read
into the record at the trial of case no. 132. Paragraph
8 contradicts Amoss and this creates a fact issue.
Mr. Bem1ion's affidavit further shows photographs
purporting to show damage done by Amoss, which
photographs are lettered A through R. Photographs
A and Bare not taken of Belllion ranch land but rather
of a ditch located on land belonging to the Utah Dept.
of Fish and Game,a nd which serves the Bennion life
estate. Although there is always some portion of fence
on a large ranch in need of repair, whether due to rot,
deer, cows, hunters or what have you, photograph G
depicts not a down fence but an open wire gate between the Bennion and Swan properties. Photographs
0 through R are taken of one of the farm houses on
the Bennion ranches. Photos of the same house were
before Judge Harding at the hearing for the appointment of a receiver in April, 1971, at which time the
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court was apprised of the fact that the vandalism clone
to this
was done when the deceased Heber Bennion was collecting the rents and exercizing control
thereof, which was several years prior to the execution
of the subject mortgages.
At the hearing on August 20, 1971, Amoss told
the court that the reason for the request for admissions
and interrogatories from Bennions had not been answered was because Bennions should have been aware
of the pendency of case no. 132 and that the required
answers could not in good faith be made until that case
was disposed of.
Although at the August 20 hearing Amoss admitted
not having made the payment due in 1970, they maintained that, as set forth in the pleadings, they were not
in default because of Bennions' actions. Amoss had
filed an affidavit, R-73, in support of their position. If,
as Amoss contended in their affirmative defense, R-124,
Bennions are in pari delicto in that their interference
with Amoss' business from 1964 through 1970, rendered
it impossible for Amoss to make payments due under
the subject note, then equity will not find a default.
"It is held, apparently without dissent, that a
court of equity has the power to relieve a mortgagor from the effect of an operative acceleration clause, when the default of a mortgagor was
the result of some unconscionable or inequitable
conduct of the mortgagee." 70 ALR 993.
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The court based its summary judgment on the
"pleadings, affidavits and other matters appearing in
the files," R-35; it is submitted that as to Bennions'
complaint, the base used contained and does contain
issues of fact as to the default and form of the said
mortgage.
"Summary Judgment is appropriate only when
the favored party makes a showing which precludes as a matter of law, awarding any relief
to the losing party," Tanner v. Utah Poultry &
Farmers' Cooperative, et al, 11 Utah 2d 353,
359 Pac. 2d 18.
POINT II
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT
HAVE BEEN GRANTED PRIOR TO A TRIAL
OF ALL THE ISSUES INCLUDING THOSE
OF THE COUNTERCLAIM.
Although there is no question that the trial court
has the power under Rule 56, Utah R.C.P., to grant
a partial summary judgment in the proper case, this
may not be done in all cases.
"The presence of a counterclaim predicated
upon good and substantial cause justifying a
trial, may bar a Plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment on his complaint or may preclude the
court from ordering execution of the judgment
pending the determination of the counterclaim,"
8 ALR 3d 1370.
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In the subject case, the court not only granted
Bennions' motion for summary judgment, but ordered
execution thereon, R-31.
When a partial summary judgment has been properly rendered in a case, the trial court should make
findings as to what material facts are and are not in
substantial controversy, with directions as to what further proceedings shall be had, Rule 56 ( d), Utah R.C.P.
This was not done in the subject case.
In a 1959 Washington case, Lewis County Savings
and Loan Assoc.v. Black, 374 Pac. 2d 157, the lower
court granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and dismissed Defendant's counterclaim without
prejudice, decreeing foreclosure of the subject mortgage. The appellate court held that the mortgagee was
not entitled to summary judgment ordering mortgage
foreclosed, without reference to mortgagor's pending
counterclaim based on allegations that mortgagee's
actions had damaged the subject property in an amount
greater than the mortgage loan. The court said, "However the judgment went beyond establishing facts. It
determined that respondent was entitled to a decree
of foreclosure before Appellant's affirmative defense
and counterclaim was (sic) heard on its merits."
If what Amoss asserts in their counterclaim is true,
then Bennions may owe Amoss an amount greater than
the amount owed Bennions by Amoss, and therefore
there would have been no default.
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CONCLUSION
Summary Judgment is an excellent, expeditious
tool of the courts-in a proper case and at the proper
posture of the case. However, in the instant case, it is
submitted that the lower court should either have stayed
the proceedings pending the outcome of case No. 132,
as stated in Amoss' Third Defense, R-124, or have
ordered the case set for trial so that all of the issues
might be determined prior to the disposing of the subject land at a distressed price.
The judgment and decree of the lower court should
be reversed and the case remanded for a trial.
Respectfully submitted,

DUDLEY M. AMOSS

Attorney for Defendants-Appellants
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